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[Wittgenstein] once greeted me with the question: “Why do people
say that it was natural to think that the sun went round the earth
rather than that the earth turned on its axis?” I replied: “I suppose, because it looked as if the sun went round the earth.” “Well,”
he asked, “what would it have looked like if it had looked as if the
earth turned on its axis?”1

INTRODUCTION
Although Ben has discussed my work in print before,2 this is the
first occasion I have had to return the favor by discussing his. We
have been discussing philosophy for more than forty years, so my remarks are, at least in that sense, long overdue. John, too, has written
about my work, both with Ben3 and on his own,4 and we have had
many conversations about our respective work, most of them consisting of my insisting that we don’t disagree, and John’s attempting to
articulate the sense in which we do. This, too, is an overdue opportunity for me to return the favor.
Having been slotted into a session on John and Ben’s views about
corrective justice, my focus will be what I will suggest are their misunderstandings of it. In the past I’ve tried to convince them that their
illuminating account of civil recourse is not an alternative to a correc-

Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Toronto. I am grateful to Peter
Benson, Paul Hurley, Dennis Klimchuk, Jason Nyers, and Stephen Smith for comments on
an earlier draft, and to Ernest Weinrib and Ben Zipursky both for comments and, even
more so, for many decades of conversations.
1. G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, AN INTRODUCTION TO WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS 151 (1959).
2. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695
passim (2003).
3. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917
passim (2010).
4. John C.P. Goldberg, Rights and Wrongs, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1828 passim (1999);
John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 passim (2003).
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tive justice view, but either a complement to it or a component of it.
Still, Goldberg and Zipursky repeatedly use the idea of corrective justice as a foil against which to contrast their own view of civil recourse. Most of their case against corrective justice consists in variations on the claim that if corrective justice were the organizing structure of tort law, it would look very different than it does.
My purpose here is to set the record straight on corrective justice
and to show that the empirical features of tort law for which corrective justice is putatively unable to account are actually direct expressions of it. The same four allegations show up again and again in
their writing, but, with respect to each of them, Goldberg and
Zipursky have not only failed to establish their case, but have failed
to so much as state a cause of action. If the doctrinal structure of the
law is exactly as they contend, each feature to which they draw attention is consistent with corrective justice. Three of the four allegations focus on remedies; they seem much more nearly ready to accept
the corrective justice account of wrongs. But the burden of my argument will be to show that the corrective justice account of wrongs
generates the corrective justice account of remedies and, further, that
properly understood, the idea of recourse is the appropriate way of
instantiating the corrective justice account.
Goldberg and Zipursky seek to separate civil recourse from corrective justice by showing that tort law, at least as it is found in the
United States of America, does not work in the ways in which corrective justice theory says that it must. The strategy of separation, in
turn, rests on a separation between wrongs and remedies, a separation between ideas of risk and ideas of ordinariness, a separation between abstract characterizations of rights and contingent social
norms, and, finally, a separation between a wrong done against the
plaintiff and her power to exact a remedy. I shall argue that none of
these separations can be made.
Before doing so, however, some preliminary matters must be addressed. The first of these is that the term “corrective” sounds irredeemably and irremediably remedial. Whether this is so of course
depends on how it is understood, but distinguished scholars of tort
law, including Jules Coleman and Stephen Perry, have, in the process of articulating an alternative to the economic analysis of tort
law, used the term “corrective justice” to refer to what is arguably a
remedial view, a view that is supposed to explain why defendant
owes plaintiff a duty to repair harms for which defendant is responsible. Indeed, Coleman goes so far as to compare the principle of corrective justice to the principle of retributive justice and to characterize both as principles that do not presuppose a unique characterization of the nature of wrongdoing, and so, at least in principle, as consistent with a variety of different accounts of the nature of the
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wrongs to be corrected.5 Perry, by contrast, characterizes it in terms
of the correction of harms for which the tortfeasor is responsible,
where that responsibility, in turn, is to be analyzed in terms of having had an adequate capacity and opportunity to avoid causing those
harms.6 It is not my purpose here to engage with the important work
of Coleman and Perry or to examine its relation to that of Goldberg
and Zipursky; unlike some others, they do not criticize corrective justice for being merely remedial.7 I mention it here only by way of contrast with the account I will be developing.
In order to mark that contrast more clearly and, more generally,
to avoid these distracting apparent implications of the term “corrective justice,” I had thought to call it instead “co-rective justice,” that
is, the justice of right between persons. Since that is cumbersome
and, when overheard in conversation, still misleading, I then thought
it might be a good idea to shorten it to “rective justice” or, for purposes of brevity of expression, just to “rect.” Unfortunately, my bilingual
spellchecker keeps changing that to “recht,” Kant’s word for “right,”
so I will use the vocabulary of corrective justice and the vocabulary of
right interchangeably.
Second, Zipursky and Goldberg also criticize my colleague Ernest
Weinrib’s specific formulation of corrective justice on the grounds of
it being excessively metaphysical, and, in so doing, thereby failing to
come to terms with the fact that tort law is a human institution.8 In
its place they recommend what they call “pragmatic conceptualism,”
which focuses on the conceptual structure of tort law, but does so in a
way that purports to be less metaphysically laden and leaden. I will
have more to say in what follows about pragmatic conceptualism.9 My
own characterization of right will be avowedly conceptual and, I
hope, for present purposes, adequately pragmatic. I will work with a
minimal conception of what it is to give a conceptual account: to focus
on a legal area in conceptual terms is to characterize the form of reasoning in which its characteristic concepts figure and the inferential
5. JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 31-34 (2001).
6. See generally Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of
Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
7. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Is Tort a Remedial Institution? (Univ. S. Cal. Law,
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10-10 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633687.
8. Zipursky characterizes Weinrib’s formalism as “metaphysically elaborate and
antipragmatic.” Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457,
458 (2000). The word “pragmatic” is spoken in many ways, but I take Zipursky’s contention
to be that Weinrib overlooks the contingency that runs through legal institutions. He later
sets out what he takes to be the requirement for a proper conceptual theory: “independence
from metaphysically rich notions in explaining and expounding the theory.” Id. at 469 n.45.
9. Bear in mind that avoiding metaphysics is much more difficult than denouncing
it. As Allen Wood once remarked to me, “Empiricism is the a priori theory that there is no
a priori knowledge.”
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relations between them. To say that they figure in a form of reasoning is to say that they figure in a certain way, independent of the
particular matter to which the reasoning is applied. Rather than attempt to reduce these abstract concepts to other types of concepts
that are thought to have, for example, a better empirical or scientific
pedigree or to replace them with such concepts or to do entirely without the concept of a concept and focus exclusively on the empirical
psychology of decisionmaking,10 my conceptual account will focus on
how those concepts figure in reasoning. In order to deflect any accusations of being excessively metaphysical, I take no stand here on
what, exactly, concepts are, or where they reside, or even about
whether talk about concepts residing is a helpful metaphor. In keeping with my concern to avoid metaphysical side issues, I will also
avoid all reference to the concept of a “practice” which seems to me to
be at least as empirically dubious and as packed with metaphysical
subtleties and theological niceties as anything to be found in any of
Aristotle, Kant, or Hegel.11 Again, it is sometimes said that the reasons that courts give are mere window dressing for conclusions
reached on some other basis. In offering a conceptual account, I will
take those reasons at face value, since the charge of window dressing
almost always reflects a general assumption that the reasons offered
by courts provide no guidance in deciding cases. But the only way to
assess that allegation is to look at the reasoning in which the reasons
characteristically figure. In what follows, I assume that Zipursky and
Goldberg intend their account to be conceptual in the same sense.
Third, Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge the importance of the
corrective justice critique of economic and other instrumental approaches to law. That critique, as formulated initially by Weinrib and
Coleman, argues in its broadest form that economic analysis is onesided in a way that makes it unable to explain the most basic and
familiar features of tort law.12 By focusing only on the question of
what incentives will lead defendant to take the appropriate level of
precaution, economic analysis is unable to explain why plaintiff, in
10. See, e.g., WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (1960); W.V. Quine,
Epistemology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY & OTHER ESSAYS 69 (1969) (arguing against the “idea idea” in the philosophy of language); BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING
JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007) (applying Quine’s philosophical naturalism to issues in legal philosophy).
11. I do not mean to deny that there are useful ways to talk about practices, as when
an organization generates a list of “best practices” for handling a certain type of recurring
issue, or when the House of Lords issued a “Practice Statement” explaining its decision to
entertain the possibility of overturning its own precedents. My objection is only to the
thought that talk about social practices provides any illumination of such well-worn philosophical concepts as that of a norm, or a rule, rather than presupposing those concepts.
12. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 46-48 (1995); see also JULES L.
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL
THEORY 20-21 (2001); Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233,
1245 (1988).
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particular, should be the one who recovers those damages, and equally unable to explain why the measure of those damages should be
plaintiff’s injury. Other instrumentalist accounts, including those
that focus on compensation in addition to deterrence, introduce the
plaintiff into their analysis but face a different version of the same
difficulty. In addition to being unable to explain why a plaintiff, in
particular, should be the one charged with policing defendant’s conduct, they double their difficulties by also being unable to explain
why defendant, in particular, should be the one charged with compensating plaintiff. The corrective justice critique of instrumental
accounts does not deny that those accounts are able to generate elaborate explanations of incentive structures, administrative convenience, and so on. Their difficulty, from the point of view of the corrective justice critique, is that they render the basic structure of a tort
action, in which plaintiff recovers from defendant because defendant
has wronged her, as merely coincidental. On an instrumentalist account, plaintiff’s allegation that she is entitled to a remedy because
she has been wronged by defendant plays no part in the court’s resolution of the dispute between them; indeed, for an instrumentalist,
the dispute between the parties that the court purports to resolve is
not the ground of defendant’s liability to plaintiff at all. It is simply a
convenient opportunity to pursue some other purpose. This is not only a failure to emphasize what the corrective justice theorists think
most important; it is a failure to recognize the force of the “because”
in the formulation “plaintiff recovers from defendant because defendant has wronged her.” The central claim of corrective justice is that a
private dispute is to be resolved exclusively in terms of the transaction between the parties, what one person has wrongfully done to another, rather than on one or both of what one has wrongly done, and
what has happened to another.
Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge the fundamental importance
of the corrective justice critique of economic analysis and their broad
debts to the work of corrective justice scholars more generally.13 By
building on it they have played a central role in the reinvigoration of
discussions of duty in American legal scholarship. Their objection
seeks to adopt the same focus on the mode of reasoning in order to
show that corrective justice fails to account for the structure of tort
law. The dialectical structure of the debate thus comes down to this:
starting off with the idea that tort law is, as Goldberg and Zipursky
put it, “a law of wrongs,”14 does this show that it is a structure of corrective justice, of civil recourse, or both?

13. See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3.
14. Id. at 918, 985. See also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law
and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007).
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Against this background, and putting to one side the charge of being merely remedial and the accusation of excessive metaphysical
ambitions, by my count, Goldberg and Zipursky offer four arguments
that are supposed to show that the corrective justice account fails to
capture the fundamental structural and conceptual features of tort
law. The first of these is the charge that corrective justice cannot account for the diversity of different interests protected by tort law.15
Coming from the opposite direction, the second is that it cannot account for the diversity of different remedies given by courts when
wrongs are committed.16 The third is that corrective justice theory
cannot explain why a tort suit is initiated by the aggrieved plaintiff,
that is, why the plaintiff has the power to proceed against the defendant who she alleges has wronged her, rather than the state stepping in to correct the injustice done by defendant.17 Fourth, and finally, Goldberg and Zipursky charge that in the tort of negligence, corrective justice is unable to explain the way in which ordinariness figures in the characterization of reasonable care.18 Although Goldberg
and Zipursky refer to the first of these four challenges as the “hodgepodge” problem, I do not think that the four challenges themselves
are merely a hodgepodge. Indeed, I think that three of them are explicitly variations on a single theme, according to which corrective
justice is insufficiently attentive to the role of social and institutional
contingency in the law. The fourth, concerning the role of the state,
and the nature of the private power exercised by an aggrieved plaintiff, is partially distinct, but even it points to a distinctive feature of
contemporary legal institutions and charges that the corrective justice account makes this feature unintelligible. The challenges are
supposed to add up to the conclusion that rather than a system of
corrective justice, “tort is a civilized alternative to vengeance–civil
recourse for the plaintiff, which is appropriately channeled through
and cabined by law.”19 Were they successful, the challenges would
show that tort law is not a matter of corrective justice, but a mere
cabining of impulses to which a civilized society dares not give free rein.
My aim in this Article will be to show that none of the objections
holds up. All rest on a misguided conceptualization of corrective justice. Having accepted the relational nature of wrongdoing and the
fundamental importance of wrongs to the law of tort, Goldberg and
Zipursky give up on the idea of relational wrongs too quickly. Each of
the objections does not introduce a counterexample to the corrective

15. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 954-57.
16. Id. at 960-63.
17. Id. at 957-60.
18. Id. at 978.
19. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal
Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1581 (2006).

2011]

SEPARATION OF WRONGS AND REMEDIES

169

justice account, but rather points to the specific way in which the abstract concepts of private right may be realized in determinate human
institutions. From the standpoint of the conceptual account, this is
all for the good, since, as I will also show, the cabining of impulses is
not something of which a relational conceptual account could be given.
The Article is structured as follows: Part I sets out, in brief and
highly abstract terms, a conceptual account of Kantian Right.20 Part
II provides a characterization of what it is to remedy a private wrong
from the standpoint of Kantian Right. Part III explains why these
abstract ideas of right require concrete instantiation in legal institutions. Part IV returns to the four challenges Goldberg and Zipursky
raise and shows that each of them can be understood as not merely a
possible instantiation but, fundamentally, the central instantiation of
the abstract ideas in legal institutions. Part V concludes with some
reflections on conceptualism and contingency.
I. PRIVATE WRONGS
Private law governs relations between private persons; the private
law of tort protects person, property, and reputation against wrongs
by other private persons. For purposes of exposition, and reasons of
space, I will put torts involving reputation to one side.21 In character20. IMMANUEL KANT, Metaphysical First Principals of the Doctrine of Right, in THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS Ak. 6:205, at 35 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
1991) (1797). I develop Kant’s account of private right in more detail in ARTHUR RIPSTEIN,
FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2009). The Kantian view
developed here is not to be confused with the view that Goldberg and Zipursky characterize
as Kantianism, which they say has “[r]ightly or wrongly” been taken to insist that “insofar
as one is in the business of identifying genuine wrongs (rather than using the term
‘wrongs’ as an empty placeholder), one must focus on acts and not results lest mere happenstance be allowed to infect what should be non-contingent judgments of right and
wrong.” Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 936, 942. For Kant, a wrong is an interference with another’s freedom; as such, wrong is relational and always necessarily comprehends
a transaction between two parties, rather than any monadic feature of either of them.
21. A few words are in order, if only to preempt any suggestion that I do so because a
Kantian view cannot explain wrongs against reputation: torts of defamation protect your
right to your own good name, which is, as Kant remarks, an innate right (one that does not
require an affirmative act to establish it) that exists only externally (in the words and
thoughts of others.) See KANT, supra note 20, Ak. 6:295, at 111-12. Wrongs against reputation involve using a person’s reputation in a way that he or she has not authorized. They
are, to use the terminology developed below, trespass-based. That is why no showing of
either fault or harm is required, and why, in the absence of harm, general damages are
assessed. Most significantly, you do not have a right to reputation because reputation is
useful to you. Instead, you have a right to reputation regardless of whether it is useful to
you or not, but you have a claim against those who interfere with it because you have a
right, not because it is useful. That is why defamation must always be about and concerning the plaintiff in particular. The plaintiff herself might well suffer loss or disadvantage
because of damage done to the reputation of another. But that does not give rise to a cause
of action. Your reputation is something you already have, which is yours to develop and
provides the basis on which others decide whether to interact with you and on what terms.
I plan to take these topics up in more detail in “Your Own Good Name,” a chapter of ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS: TORT LAW AS PHILOSOPHY (forthcoming 2014).
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izing those wrongs, private right is concerned exclusively with the
means that a person uses, and abstracts completely from the ends
being pursued through the use of those means. As the law of wrongs,
tort law’s focus on the means a person has, and the ways in which he
or she is entitled to use them, both sets the problem to which it is the
solution and generates the contours of that solution.
Private right is concerned with means in two senses. First, the
interests that it characteristically protects—person and property—
are protected as means, that is, as the conditions of a person’s ongoing capacity to set and pursue purposes, rather than as aspects of a
person’s well-being. Private right begins with the familiar idea that
in order to set and pursue a purpose, you must take yourself to have
means available that you take to be sufficient to achieve it. You can
wish for something that you have no means of achieving, but you can
only choose to do something by taking up means towards it. Your
means may prove inadequate, or circumstances may frustrate you.
Or perhaps it turns out that you succeed but come to regret having
chosen the path that you did. But to act for the sake of achieving an
end, you need to use means. The means that you have are, from the
point of view of the law of tort, just your own person, that is, your
bodily powers and mental capacities (as well as your reputation) and
whatever things outside of your body which are yours, that is, your
property. Your property counts as your means because you alone, as
against other private persons, are entitled to determine the purposes
for which it will be used. That is why someone can wrong you by using your property without your permission, even if you suffer no
measurable loss. Again, although there is something potentially misleading about saying that you have your own physical and mental
powers merely as means, the misleading impression can be allayed
by focusing on the contrastive sense in which this is intended. To say
that they are yours, as against others, is finally to say that you, rather than anyone else, are the one who gets to decide how they will
be used. That is, once more, why you can be wronged if somebody
touches you without your authorization: that person uses your person—your body—for a purpose that you have not set.
In characterizing your entitlement in terms of the means that you
have, private right pays no attention to the ends for which you might
use those means. Against this background, it is misleading to characterize private right as protecting interests, if this is taken to mean
that the interests protected have normative significance, or can even
be characterized, apart from the rights that protect them. To the contrary, each person’s entitlement to use his or her own means, and
determine how they will be used, gets its normative significance from
being part of a system of rights, that is, a system of restrictions on
each person’s behavior in which each may enjoy independence from
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all of the others. The idea of independence is itself relational; relational rights are not granted to protect interests taken to matter
apart from them; interests are protected on the basis of rights.
These rights are relational in a highly specific sense: they involve
non-comparative relations. If I say that one ball is heavier or hotter
than another, I relate them to each other comparatively; each has a
mass and temperature apart from the other and could have that
mass and temperature if it were the only thing that ever existed. If I
characterize someone as an uncle, I am describing him in relation to
some niece or nephew; nobody is an uncle to any degree whatsoever
except in relation to the offspring of his siblings, and anyone who is
an uncle at all is entirely an uncle; unclehood does not come in degrees. “Wrong” is like “uncle,” not like “mass” or “temperature.” In
characterizing an act as a wrong or a person as a wrongdoer, the law
of tort works with a non-comparatively relational conception of
wrongs. It follows from this that although the object of a right such as
your horse or your right arm will have a magnitude and a degree in
the sense that it is what it is apart from juridical relations to others,
your right to it has neither a magnitude nor a degree. It is your entitlement to constrain the conduct of others in a certain way, which
you either have or lack with respect to a given object. That is the
sense in which private right is to be characterized in terms of a form
of reasoning: the rights figure in reasoning in the same way, as a
constraint on the conduct of others apart from the specifics of the object
of the right. Neither how bad it would be for you to have a right violated or how burdensome it would be for others to be constrained by
it is relevant to its existence. Rights in private law are relational and
all reasoning about them reflects and preserves their relational nature.
A purely relational right does not serve to protect an interest in
your means that can be characterized apart from the right that protects it; to the contrary, the sense in which your means are your own
is that you alone, as against others, are entitled to determine the
purposes for which they will be used. Your right is the constraint on
the conduct of others, and if someone violates your right, the constraint on that person’s conduct survives and provides the basis for
the remedy.
Second, as well as characterizing the interests protected by the
law of tort in terms of the means that you have and your concomitant
entitlement to decide which purposes to pursue, the restrictions imposed by the law of tort restrict the means that others may use. Just
as the entitlement to your person and property does not depend on
the purposes for which you are using them, so, too, the restrictions on
others imposed by your right to person and property do not depend
on the purposes that those others might be pursuing. Wrongs against
person and property restrict the use of means in two straightforward
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senses: First of all, the law of tort prohibits trespasses of all forms.
You are not entitled to use or even touch another person’s body or
property without that person’s permission, and you are not allowed to
do so quite apart from whatever worthy or unworthy purpose you
might be pursuing. Second, you are not entitled to injure other people, either in their person or their property, by using your own property in ways that characteristically cause such injuries.
The first set of restrictions generates a wide variety of trespassbased torts; the second set generates what I have elsewhere described as “harm-based” torts, including both nuisance and negligence. In a trespass-based wrong, liability is premised on defendant’s
use of plaintiff’s person or property. Defendant need only intend to
use something that is another’s, and a trespass can be committed,
even if defendant did not, or even could not, know the title of the
thing being used.22 This structure is clearest in the case of simple
trespass to land, which is a wrong against the owner of the land, even
in cases in which the trespasser made an honest or even unavoidable
mistake with respect to title or the location of the boundary line. The
same structure applies in trespasses against chattels and, at least in
principle, with respect to trespass against persons, even if, as it turns
out, there are few cases in which defendant has made an innocent
mistake as to whether this particular person had authorized the
touching in question. The absence of any requirement that defendant
should have known in trespass follows from the fact that each person’s entitlement to use his or her means to set and pursue his or her
own purposes can be exercised consistently with everyone else using
their own means, and each person’s entitlement to use those means
does not shade over into any entitlement whatsoever to use means
belonging to another. The structure of trespass is formal in that the
nature of the right at issue, and so of the wrongs that violate it, can
be characterized apart from the specifics of the object of the right.
In harm-based torts, by contrast, rights are qualified in part on
what the defendant should have thought about. Harm-based torts
concern the side effects of one person’s use of his or her own means
on the ability of others to continue using their own means. For example, the tort of nuisance is organized around the thought that a landowner’s use and enjoyment of his or her own land will inevitably have
side effects on his or her neighbors. Something counts as an actiona-

22. Goldberg characterizes trespass as “a tort that combines an element of intentionality with an element of strict liability.” John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status
of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE
L.J. 524, 598 (2005). The characterization of liability as strict makes things unduly complicated; the wrong consists in using what belongs to another, not in failure to take account
of something. So, too, with the characterization of intentionality; you can only use something intentionally.
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ble side effect if it interferes with the neighbor’s ability to use and
enjoy his or her own land. Given that some side effects are inevitable,
the question of whether a particular side effect constitutes a nuisance
turns into the question of whether it is excessive in relation to the
ability of a plurality of neighbors to each use and enjoy his or her own
land, consistent with the ability of other neighbors to do the same.
In the tort of negligence, the same general form of reasoning prohibits people from injuring each other’s means through dangerous
use of their own means. As people use their means, whether their
own bodies or chattels, some side effects on others are inevitable, including injuries to others. The law of negligence characterizes the
relations between persons that give rise to restrictions on how each
may permissibly use his or her own means and enters into the determination of whether defendant’s conduct was too dangerous, that
is, whether it was of a type that, in the circumstances, was too likely
to interfere with plaintiff’s security of his or her means. Once more
the account is formal: whether defendant has wrongfully damaged or
destroyed plaintiff’s means is determined in abstraction from the
particular features of those means, and so apart from how bad it is
for plaintiff to be deprived of them, or how costly it was for defendant
to avoid damaging them.
This austere structure of protecting each person’s means against
use by others, or damage through the excessive side effects of other
people’s use of their means, generates the familiar structure of the
law of tort. Most importantly, it generates the fundamental distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance, that is, between wronging someone and failing to confer a benefit on that person. To interfere with what another person already has is a wrong, but to fail to
provide aid to that person, no matter how badly that person needs it,
is not. Again, to interfere with someone’s person or property is a
wrong, but to fail to protect that person or property is not. And, to
interfere with something upon which another person depends but
does not own is not a wrong. Most significantly, a bad motive—the
pursuit of a worthless or evil end—does not make an otherwise permissible act wrongful.23 Thus, the Holmesian doctrine of prima facie
tort sits uneasily with torts as a law of wrongs.
These distinctions reflect the way in which private right is fundamentally a doctrine of means. That is why if someone needs something, but has no way of getting it, private right takes no interest.
Private right only protects what people already have. For the same
reason, if you carelessly or even maliciously destroy something upon

23. I take this issue up in detail in Arthur Ripstein, Motive and Intention in Tort
Law, Lecture Before the Tort Law Research Group, Faculty of Law, University of Western
Ontario (Nov. 3, 2010).
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which another person depends, but does not own, you do no wrong as
against that person, but wrong only the owner of the object. As a systematic doctrine of means, private right represents all questions of
entitlement, whether to the security of your means or the scope within which you may use them, in purely relational terms. You do not
have a right that your means be secure; you have only a right that
others not damage them by acting in characteristically damaging
ways; you do no wrong by using your means dangerously if you do not
injure another’s means. That is just to say that your entitlement to
your means constrains other persons as their entitlement to theirs
constrains you.
This structure of means is central to Goldberg and Zipursky’s other signature contribution to contemporary tort theory, their emphasis
on the fundamental role of duty in the law of negligence. Each person’s right to person and property is also thereby correlative to a duty
on the part of others to avoid interfering with person and property.
The “duty question,” so prominent in negligence cases in the early
part of the twentieth century, still prominent in Commonwealth legal
systems, and, until Goldberg and Zipursky’s intervention, very much
on the defensive in American law, concerns whether plaintiff and defendant are in the right relationship to give rise to a legal obligation.24 The “no duty” cases are all cases in which plaintiff fails to
state a cause of action either by failing to allege,25 or by alleging but
failing to establish,26 that the vulnerability of her means generated a
prospective constraint on defendant’s conduct. If defendant owed
plaintiff no duty, then, whatever the other defects in defendant’s action, and whenever the loss to plaintiff occasioned by the defective
action, no wrong has taken place.
In the same way, the causation requirement for all harm-based
torts reflects the fact that tort law is a doctrine of means. You do not
wrong another person by doing something that is prone or even likely
to interfere with her means; you only wrong her if you interfere with
those means. Merely putting those means at risk is consistent with
another person being able to use them as he or she sees fit.
For the same reason, not just any causal relation between defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s loss constitutes a wrong. An injury is only wrongful if it is within the ambit of the risk that makes defendant’s conduct negligent. If defendant did not need to look out for a

24. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky , The Restatement (Third)
and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657 (2001); John C.P. Goldberg
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1745-77 (1998).
25. See Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. of Pleas); Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
26. See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928); Childs v.
Desormeaux, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643 (Can.).

2011]

SEPARATION OF WRONGS AND REMEDIES

175

particular aspect of plaintiff’s safety, loss to that aspect is not the realization of a wrong, no matter how defective defendant’s conduct or
serious plaintiff’s loss. Remoteness—what American courts call
“proximate cause”—is relational because risk is.
This characterization of private right as a doctrine of means is
conceptual in Zipursky’s intended sense since it characterizes the
broad doctrinal structure of private right in terms of the interrelations
between a set of concepts regarding the ways in which each person
can use his or her own means to set and pursue his or her own purposes and is bound only by the entitlement of others to do the same.
In laying out the structure of right, I have focused on the way in
which one person’s entitlement to what he or she already has constrains the conduct of others. These constraints, in turn, generate the
concept of a wrong, which is just an action inconsistent with another’s entitlements. Because the entitlements are constraints on the
conduct of others, the wrongs are always relational; private right
asks not what someone has done, or what has happened, but what
one person has done to another.
The characteristic questions that courts ask in processing a tort
action reflect this conceptual structure, and facts enter into the
court’s determinations as premises in reasoning within this structure.
In harm-based torts, questions of duty, remoteness, and standard of
care (or their analogues)27 all focus on the structure of plaintiff’s entitlement as against defendant in order to determine whether defendant has completed a wrong against plaintiff. In trespass-based
torts, the inquiry focuses on whether defendant used something of
plaintiff’s without plaintiff’s authorization. All of these inquiries
are fact-sensitive, but the facts are classified through the concepts.
None of behaving badly, causing loss, or causing loss as a consequence of behaving badly is enough. The factual inquiry follows the
conceptual sequence.
Corrective justice is a principle for courts, rather than either an
empirical description of a tendency in their decisions or a normative
principle that they should implement which makes no essential reference to their operations. The principle of corrective justice directs a
court to resolve a private dispute entirely in terms of what transpired
between the parties and provides the relevant concepts with which to
characterize the transaction. It does not, apart from the decision or
anticipated decision of a court, tell the parties how to resolve their
27. For example, in the tort of nuisance, the locality rule functions as the analogue of
the standard of care, and physical proximity stands in for the duty question. In cases of
negligent misrepresentation, the question of the person to whom a representation was
made goes in the “duty” slot, the question of the transaction with respect to which the representation was made into the “remoteness” slot, plaintiff’s reliance into the “causation”
slot, and standard accounting practice into the “standard of care” slot.
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dispute. Nor does it impose a moral duty of repair of which a court’s
task is to remind the parties. Absent a demand by the plaintiff, as
affirmed by the court, there is no such duty. The parties are free to
resolve their dispute as they see fit, because it is a dispute about
their rights as against each other, and each of them is entitled to exercise those rights as he or she sees fit. A court resolving a dispute in
terms of corrective justice looks only to the transaction that is the
subject of the dispute and so reasons in a specific way.
A form of reasoning is much more abstract than any of its instances, and to say that courts characteristically engage in a form of reasoning is not to make an empirical generalization which is subject to
refutation by any counterexample or even to offer a hypothesis that
holds true most of the time. Instead, it is more like the concept of an
argument, understood as a series of claims that support a given conclusion. The basic way of thinking about argumentation is to start
with good arguments, those in which the premises support the conclusion. It is perfectly consistent with this way of thinking about
what an argument is to acknowledge that people sometimes, perhaps
often, or even usually make bad arguments, that is, ones in which the
premises do not support the conclusion. A bad argument is defective
as an argument because of its failure to conform to the standards relevant to giving grounds for a conclusion. It is also possible to concede
further that on occasion people try to get other people to believe
things without so much as trying to provide a rational basis, through
a variety of means.
Private right, as I have characterized it so far, is an abstract mode
of argumentation about the rights that purposive beings have against
each other. Such an account is consistent with conceding that courts
do not always consistently follow it. In such cases, the court’s reasoning is defective because it fails to conform to the standards relevant
to resolving a dispute between two persons solely in terms of what
transpired between them. Factors independent of the transaction are
irrelevant. Because the concepts of private right are abstract, particular doctrines and decisions need to be interpreted in terms of them,
so that, for example, if some torts appear to involve nothing more
than a “pay as you go” rule for engaging in dangerous activities, the
corrective justice approach recommends examining them and seeing
whether, in fact, they involve wrongs after all rather than concluding
too quickly that they are marginal or even outside tort law.28 For reasons to be explained in Part III, its abstract structure shows how issues
must be framed without always resolving them. Further, because it is
a form of reasoning, the corrective justice approach provides the re-

28. Contra Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 951-52 (characterizing Rylands v.
Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.)).
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sources for distinguishing between correct and incorrect instances of
it. It can characterize at least some apparent counterexamples as
misapplications of its requirements. For example, if a court engages
in explicitly non-relational reasoning, whether utilitarian or punitive,
or in talk about duty or proximate cause as “control devices” or analysis of pure economic loss in terms of “floodgates,” it may be that the
best characterization of what it is doing is as a defective instance of
resolving a dispute about a relational wrong. The point here is not
that corrective justice must be saved in the face of recalcitrant data,
but rather that the claim that tort law embodies a principle of corrective justice is an analysis of a mode of reasoning. As such its analytically basic case is its successful operation. If it never operated successfully, there could be no grounds for analyzing tort law in terms of
it. But its normative structure allows departures from it to be identified as misapplications of a set of integrated concepts.
II. WRONGS AND THEIR REPAIR
My characterization of private right so far has been exclusively in
terms of rights and duties; I have said little, as yet, about wrongdoing and nothing about its repair, except whatever might be implicit
in the characterization of the relevant duties, that is, that someone
who breaches a duty owed to another wrongs that other. My purpose
in this Section is to further explicate what is implicit in the characterization of the relevant duties, so as to provide an account of
wrongs and their remedies. Because remedies are remedial, the
availability and justification of a remedy must always depend upon
the antecedent existence of a right; because rights must form a consistent set, the specification of the underlying rights can be completed without any reference to any wrong actually occurring.
From the standpoint of private right, a wrong is simply an interference with means to which plaintiff has a right. As the example of harmless trespasses shows, a wrong need not involve any loss. Conversely,
as the “no duty” cases show, a loss need not involve a wrong, even if
it is brought about through defendant’s misconduct towards others.
When a wrong occurs, however, the same set of concepts that generated the underlying rights and correlative duties also generates an
account of remedies. Put in the barest conceptual terms, the idea is
simple: if someone interferes with a right that you have, the right
does not thereby cease to exist. Since your right is to the exclusive
use and security of your means, you remain entitled to the security of
your means, even if another interferes with those means and so with
your right. A remedy serves to “preserve what is mine undiminished.”29 The most transparent example of this structure is in the tort
29. KANT, supra note 20, Ak. 6:271, at 91.
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of conversion. If I convert your property, perhaps by taking your
raincoat instead of my own, it does not cease to be your raincoat as a
result of my wrong against you. The reason that you have a right to
reclaim it30 is that it is still your coat. But the fact that the coat, qua
physical object, exists through both the wrong and its remedy is not
essential to the conceptual structure that is at issue. The persistence
of the coat is inessential; the persistence of the right is essential. To
say that the right persists is to say that the constraint on my conduct
does: I am not allowed to act in a way that is inconsistent with your
claim to the coat.
The coat which is the object of the right in this example is, like all
natural objects, subject to generation and decay, and your right to it
is not a right to its persistence or even your continued possession of
it; it is a right that others not use the coat or damage or destroy it in
certain ways. If I take your coat, I violate that right, but my wrongful
act does not change the right. The sense in which the right persists is
just that the fact that it is yours was a constraint on my action, a
constraint which I violated (whether knowingly or otherwise). It
would be no constraint on my action if I could abolish it simply by
acting contrary to it; you would have no right to your coat, as against
me, if I could extinguish any such right simply by acting contrary to
it. So it remains your coat after I take it; I must give it back because I
was not supposed to take it.
The same structure applies in cases of so-called “make whole”
damages in a negligence action, which give you back the equivalent
of thing that you lost. If I negligently destroy your coat, the coat no
longer exists. But your right to your coat—that is, the constraint on
my conduct generated by the fact that you, rather than I, are the one
who is entitled to determine how it will be used—is not changed by
the fact that I acted contrary to that right. Destroying the coat does
not extinguish the right understood as a constraint on my conduct. If
the coat no longer exists, that constraint may call for different specific actions. My duty to repair, to restore to you the means to which
you have a right against me, takes the form of a duty to replace the
means of which I have deprived you. The duty to replace those means
comprehends plaintiff’s entitlement to both possession and use of
what she had. Not only must the coat be restored to your possession,
but, also, if as a result of the destruction of your coat I deprive you of
the particular use of it, I must also restore that to which you had a
right, namely the use of the coat. Your entitlement to damages for
the loss of use follows from the fact that the thing of which I deprived
you—in this example, your coat—was yours to use, that is, that you
30. Or in English law, where there is no right to replevin or vindicatio, a right to
damages in conversion.
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have it as a means with which to set and pursue purposes as you see
fit. You did not have a right to it because it was useful. Instead, it is
useful to you because you have a right to it; it is your means, and so
you alone have a right to its usefulness.31 If it were not yours, then,
no matter how useful, indeed necessary, to you it might have been,
you have no right to its usefulness—which is just the direct implication of the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance as it
figures in the “no duty” cases.32
III. PRIVATE RIGHT AND POSITIVE LAW
The account I have given of the broad structure of tort law as a
doctrine of means, whereby it protects each person’s means against
both use by others and certain side effects of other people’s use of
their means and remedies any wrongs by restoring means or their
equivalent, is, to say the least, highly abstract. Indeed, it might seem
to be so abstract as to be incapable of deciding any cases. I now want
to suggest, however, first, that its abstractness is a fundamental virtue and, second of all, that it requires institutional expression in order to decide most cases. I say “most” because the fundamental distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance is already sufficient to
identify a class of cases in which plaintiff simply fails to state a cause
of action. If plaintiff alleges that he suffered a loss as a result of defendant’s breach of a contract with a third party, plaintiff fails to
state a cause of action; the same result obtains if plaintiff’s allegation
concerns a tort against a third party. So, too, if plaintiff concedes that
there was no apparent connection between defendant’s activity and
the prospect of injuring her. Such an unforeseeable plaintiff is conceptually incapable of claiming that defendant should have taken account of her safety; as unforeseeable, she is thereby in the class of
persons of whom no account can be taken. So, too, if plaintiff’s allegation is that defendant fails to take the minimal steps that a minimally decent human being would take to accommodate her needs or aid
her in her efforts, she necessarily fails to state a cause of action. The31. On the use and usefulness of the object of a right to what is yours as the basis of
consequential damages, see Peter Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1673, 1727 (2007).
32. Goldberg and Zipursky object to corrective justice on the grounds that it should
lead exclusively to “make-whole” damages, and so is unable to explain consequential damages, which they refer to by the unfortunate and misleading name of “parasitic damages.”
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 963. The latter term is usually taken to describe
damages that are not consequential on a wrong but which plaintiff recovers anyway as a
result of having suffered a different wrong. See Lord Denning’s disparaging remarks about
parasitic damages in Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co., [1973] 1 Q.B. 27, 28. My
colleague Ernest Weinrib has a more detailed discussion of consequential damages in his
contribution to this Symposium, which I wholly endorse; my comments above are meant
only to indicate the abstract structure that is at issue. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Civil Recourse and Corrective Justice, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 273 (2011).
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se cases are not trivial, and they provide an interesting analytical
structure for a first-year torts course. However, most cases require
more; indeed, more is required even in most cases in which plaintiff
ultimately fails to state a cause of action. The more that is required is
institutions and the development of legal doctrine.
It is a familiar feature of practical thought, both in the law and
elsewhere, that abstract concepts figure in the appropriate formulation of the fundamental moral ideas, while, at the same time, those
concepts can mostly just be related to each other and are difficult or
impossible to explicate in some other, seemingly more neutral vocabulary. Nor is this feature restricted to practical thought. The difficulties of explaining something as simple as counting without recourse
to such mathematical concepts as succession are well known in the
philosophical literature.33 But the issue is particularly clear in practical contexts. Indeed, the issue provides at least part of the impetus
for both legal realism and the economic analysis of law, both of which
insist that ordinary legal thought is one or more of capacious, indeterminate, conclusory, or circular on the grounds that it cannot be
explicated in terms of social policy or economic efficiency. What economic analysis and legal realism regard as vices are, in fact, the virtues of practical thought, and the ambition of a conceptual account of
an area of practical thought is precisely that it displays the relevant
form of reasoning. Lack of determinacy would be a deficiency of the
form of reasoning in which courts engage in resolving private disputes if it could only be vindicated by being reduced to some other
form of reasoning.34
But if the realist and economic critique of ordinary legal concepts
fails to show that those concepts are illicit, it is nonetheless correct to
point to the partial indeterminacy of abstract categories and their
inability to resolve many concrete disputes. The realist’s imaginary
opponent who purports to resolve every legal case merely by deduction from concepts is, indeed, impossible. The realist’s mistake is in
concluding from this that concepts are irrelevant. Still, relevant
33. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 56-57 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 1953); see also Martin Stone, The Significance of Doing and Suffering, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 131 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
34. In saying this I don’t mean to suggest that there is no question about whether, all
things considered, one ought to reason in this way, although I would insist that the question of which things need to be considered can only be addressed within a specific form of
reasoning; the importance of various ends, both in general and for particular agents, individual or collective, who are charged with making decisions, only emerges within a particular appropriate form of reasoning. So any question about the “all things considered” appropriateness of the tort system would need to be located within a broader political philosophy
charged with examining the legitimate bases of the exercise of state power and the relation
between the two forms of dominium distinguished in the Middle Ages, proprietas and iurisdictio, private law and public law. An “all things considered” question is not, simply as
such, a question about the overall balance of good and bad consequences.

2011]

SEPARATION OF WRONGS AND REMEDIES

181

though they are, insofar as they figure in such claims as that a certain level of noise is excessive or that defendant failed to exercise
reasonable care towards plaintiff, they need to be made more determinate. Otherwise, they would turn out to be “weasel words”35
through which disputants seek to advance positions on which the
concepts are silent, and decisionmakers leave themselves the room to
make whatever decisions seem right in their own eyes.
Not every abstract form of reasoning that is potentially indeterminate in its application requires institutional expression, but the set
of concepts organizing private right plainly do. Private right characterizes the conceptual structure in which each person’s entitlement to
use his or her own means is constrained by a like entitlement on the
part of others. That is, the requirements are systematic. Further, if
everyone has the same type of entitlements, the requirements are
also objective in the familiar legal sense of that term. The unusually
sensitive plaintiff gets no solace from the law. Nor does the incompetent who tries his best get treated differently than others. Instead,
the law purports to hold everyone to the same standards on the
grounds that everyone has the same formal right to the security of
what he or she already has.
These twin demands of systematicity and objectivity entail that
the conceptual structure of private right can only be made to apply to
particulars if it is applied in the same way for everyone; otherwise, it
is inadequate to its own internal structure. That doesn’t mean that
you could not try your best to act in accordance with right in the absence of legal institutions. But, it does mean that an authoritative
determination is required in order to give effect to right. Right governs relations between private persons, and the answer, with respect
to any dispute between any pair of persons, must be the same for
both of those persons with respect to that dispute. So the austere
structure must be made more determinate, characterizing uses as
ordinary, demarcating the classes of persons of who account must be
taken when engaged in various activities, and deciding what counts
as being careful enough. Far from overlooking the fact that tort law is
a human institution, the rights-based account explains why the relevant conceptual order can only be realized in a human institution
that supposes itself to be entitled to resolve disputes and impose its
resolutions on the parties.
The rights-based account also focuses on another respect in which
abstract concepts of right need to be made institutional: it is only by
being made both systematic and enforceable that private rights comprise a system in which everyone’s means are protected. Although
35. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 96 n.39 (1975).
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the broad structure of corrective justice can be characterized in abstraction from institutions, it cannot be given effect except through
them. General legal rules must issue from an authoritative source;
particular orders authorize compulsion in light of the law.36
In keeping with the official topic of the Symposium, I now want to
focus on the question of whether, as a conceptual account, the characterization of corrective justice I have offered is adequate to the law of
tort that Goldberg and Zipursky seek to explain. The question of how
to determine whether an abstract account is adequate to something
encountered in experience—whether characterized in terms of confirmation, verification, or application—is not, on its own, a conceptual matter. However, it needs to be addressed in a way that is consistent with the conceptual nature of the inquiry. Even though the
concepts do not apply themselves, I want to suggest that, just as
they require institutional expression in order to give determinate answers, so, too, they require a specific kind of institutional expression.
The concepts are abstract, but contentful, rather than being concrete
and exceptionless.
IV. THE INCORPORATION STRATEGY AND
GOLDBERG AND ZIPURSKY’S OBJECTIONS
With this in mind, I now want to return to the four objections. Recall that these were, in order, that corrective justice cannot account
for the diversity of wrongs, that it is unable to comprehend the broad
spectrum of very different remedies, that it fails to explain why a tort
suit takes place at plaintiff’s initiative and involves not a right to a
remedy or duty to repair but rather a power on the part of the plaintiff to exact a remedy, and, finally, that the corrective justice account
is entirely at odds with the social nature of tort law and the ways in
which it considers standards of ordinariness.
Each of the objections can be read as an instance of a broader
strategy running through Goldberg and Zipursky’s writing, a strategy of characterizing legal doctrine as the incorporation and formalization of social norms that are antecedent to it and contingently taken up by it, based on general assessments of weight or significance.
This strategy is in turn infused with a contrast between the ordinariness of tort law and high abstractions about risk and rights. I am not
sure of the depth of their commitment to this strategy; in developing
other aspects of their view, they do not seem to rely on it. Each of the
objections is formulated in terms of it. I take no stand here on whether these are incautious overstatements or are instead implications of
their rejection of views that are too “metaphysical.” I hope they are
the former, for I will endeavor to show that the incorporation strate36. I explain this in more detail in Force and Freedom, RIPSTEIN, supra note 20.
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gy in indefensible and that, stripped of it, civil recourse theory is indistinguishable from corrective justice.
The strategy is particularly clear in the case of the fourth objection, which is explicitly concerned with the way in which the empirical figures in tort law. Zipursky advocates a “civil competency” analysis of the reasonable person standard in the law of negligence.37 After
correctly pointing out that the Learned Hand test, much beloved of
law professors, though disliked by courts and abhorred by juries, fails
to connect in any meaningful way with the practice of courts,
Zipursky goes on to offer an alternative, focused on what an ordinary
person would do.38 He approvingly quotes from Baron Alderson’s
speech in Blyth v. Birmingham: “Negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do.”39 Zipursky takes this to show that the reasonable person
doesn’t figure as an abstraction, but rather as a kind of concrete particular. The law is filled with wording like this. Most famously, as
stated in Lord Atkin’s celebrated speech in Donoghue v. Stevenson, “I
do not think so ill of our jurisprudence as to suppose that its principles are so remote from the ordinary needs of civilized society and the
ordinary claims it makes upon its members as to deny a legal remedy
where there is so obviously a social wrong.”40 The same framing of the
issue is addressed to the question of standard of care in Lord Reid’s
speech in Bolton v. Stone: “It would take a good deal to make me believe that the law has departed so far from the standards which guide
ordinary careful people in ordinary life.”41 This appeal to the ordinary—the claim civilized society makes on its members and the
standards that guide ordinary people—is, according to Zipursky’s account, evidence that the standard of care is concerned with ordinariness, rather than with risk. In the tort of negligence, “unreasonable”
does not mean “too dangerous” but something closer to “substandard.” As he puts it, “Undoubtedly, a waiter’s careless dropping of a
plate is sometimes the product of unreasonable risk-taking, but there
is no reason to believe it always is. There is no reason to believe that
whenever someone injures another through careless conduct, like
dropping a plate, it is the result of an unreasonable risk having been
taken. If I trip walking down the sidewalk, or if I aspirate my Diet
Coke somewhat and choke, these misperformances of mine are not
37. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 W M. & MARY L. REV. 1999,
2033-41 (2007).
38. See id. at 2013-22, 2033-41.
39. Id. at 2017 (quoting Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 156 Eng. Rep.
1047 (Exch. Div.) 1049; 11 Ex. 780, 784).
40. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) at 583 (appeal taken from Scot.).
41. Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850 (H.L.) 867 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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necessarily products of risk-taking. The waiter’s dropping the soup is
no different.”42 The choice of examples makes it clear that the careless person is identified in terms of typical competence and without
any reference to the rights of others.
The same strategy figures in their characterization of duties. Although they accept the rights-based account of duties as essentially
and irreducibly relational, they sometimes represent the duties that
the law incorporates as legally significant only because they happen
to have been so incorporated. Thus, as I understand their framing of
the issue, a plethora of relational social duties are informally enforced in our society.43 The law chooses some of these and turns them
into binding legal duties. This is why the duties in question unsurprisingly form a hodgepodge; each of the duties is what it is apart
from incorporation into the law of tort and survives as a member of
the law of tort because of the official acts of recognition which instill
legal status upon it: “[W]hen a judge makes clear that she is talking
about legal duties when she is deciding a case, not moral duties, she
is indicating that she is identifying obligations within an institutionally entrenched web.”44 It is not that institutions entrench a web of
concepts by relating them to particulars; instead, the claim appears
to be that the fact of institutional entrenchment makes disparate
norms into a web.
The strategy figures yet again in the account of recourse: “Instead,
it is to appreciate that tort is a civilized alternative to vengeance—
civil recourse for the plaintiff, which is appropriately channeled
through and cabined by law.”45 There are social motivations that lead
people to become angry or worse when they believe themselves to
have been wronged. The plaintiff “feels aggrieved or injured”46 and
the tort system channels these impulses, bringing procedure to bear
on the anger. If this substitution of process for feeling is to succeed,
the court must award remedies on the basis of something other than
restoring that of which the aggrieved plaintiff was deprived.
The same incorporation strategy figures, finally, in the account of
remedies, which are presented as social norms the significance of
which does not depend on their relation to the rights the violation of
which they are supposed to remedy. Immediately after characterizing
tort as a law of recourse rather than right, Goldberg and Zipursky
explain how this ineluctably leads to the diversity of remedies:
But it is also to appreciate and accept that successful tort plaintiffs
will sometimes be entitled to something more than “justice” de42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Zipursky, supra note 37, at 2018.
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 937-38.
Id. at 953.
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 19, at 1581.
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 943.
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mands or even permits, at least if justice is understood as the
achievement of a just distribution of gains and losses as between
tortfeasor and victim. Here, the most obvious example is the eggshell plaintiff, who may stand to recover a huge amount of compensation from a minimally culpable defendant. It is questionable
whether justice is being done in such cases, but our tort system authorizes this sort of outcome because tort law is not a scheme for
restoring a normative equilibrium as between doer and sufferer. It
is, for better and worse, a law for the redress of private wrongs.47

I want to suggest, however, that the flaw is not with corrective
justice but rather with the incorporation strategy and its accompanying picture of the law of tort as a mode of social control, whose function it is to cabin reactive attitudes by channeling them into the court
system, thereby both reducing the harmful and entropic effects of
self-help, through the selection of a canonical set of wrongs that will
be actionable, and the development of a plurality of remedies calibrated to defuse the impulses that make them necessary. Each of the
objections turns on the incorporation strategy: duties form a hodgepodge because they have been incorporated based on a sense of seriousness, not violations of rights; remedies have been incorporated
because judges thought them apt; ordinary care is severed from ideas
of risk and reintroduced as the idea that ordinary conduct is less aggravating; the requirement that plaintiff alone has standing to enforce her rights is amputated from the rights being enforced only to
be reassembled as an aspect of American law that is supposed to be
both essential and merely empirical.
Goldberg and Zipursky sometimes articulate their understanding
of tort law as a structure of social control in the vocabulary of a
broadly Lockean social contract theory, according to which the legal
right to recourse is a form of compensation given to citizens in return
for their surrender of what might be thought of as an executive right
of nature.48 As Zipursky first put it, “While the state takes away the
47. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 19, at 1581.
48. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 441 (2006) (“Understandably, government generally
declines to restore that right in the form of a broad, positive-law self-help privilege.”). In a
footnote to this sentence Goldberg explains what makes this understandable: “Among other
things, declining to do so discourages continuing cycles of vengeance, protects wrongdoers
from excessive retaliation, and empowers victims who might otherwise be unable to retaliate.” Id. at 441 n.22. See also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the
Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 84 (1998) (“It is essential to our ordered society and our
legal system that we do not permit private retribution for the violation of legal rights. Having been wronged is neither an excuse nor a justification for violence against or taking from
another, except in rare cases. The law prohibits and criminalizes violence as a reaction to
legal wrongs. That is, indeed, part of what is sometimes meant by ‘the rule of law.’ Nevertheless, the often touted principle, ‘Ubi jus, ubi remedium’—where there’s a right there’s a
remedy—expresses the widely shared conviction that if one has been wronged, one ought,
in fairness, to have some recourse through the state against the wrongdoer. In other words,
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liberty of private retribution, it offers a right to civil redress in its
place. While it creates in each a vulnerability to action under the law,
it provides in return protection from the threat of private retribution.”49 He later wrote, “The natural right to seek redress is conceded
in return for a right of civil redress, a private right of action.”50 The
account is broadly Lockean because it does not hew to Locke’s own
claim that the executive right is a right to enforce rights.51 They understand it as less of a right and more of an inclination or urge to get
even with those against whom you suppose yourself to have a grievance. Having prohibited barbaric recourse, the state placates the aggrieved by providing civil recourse in its place.
In different places Goldberg and Zipursky express varying degrees
of commitment to this account. Sometimes it seems to undergird
their entire approach, but other times they mention only the consistency of their view with such an approach. I do not propose to resolve the question of the degree of their commitment to it. Instead, I
will urge that they repudiate it entirely; although it provides a clear
point of contrast with corrective justice theory, it generates an unstable amalgam of conceptual and empirical factors. That amalgam is
not only inconsistent with corrective justice, but also with the idea of
relational duties. From the point of view of placating anger, factors
other than the breach of relational duties may be relevant. For example, the motive with which an injurer acted may make a considerable difference to how the injured plaintiff feels about the injurer’s
conduct. Indeed, even if no duty existed, bad motives generate resentment. So the person who callously stands by as another drowns
invites blame, resentment, and anger, as does the person who performs an otherwise legal act out of malice. From the perspective of
blame and anger, it is difficult to see why relational duties in particular would be the focus of such an account, or why the desire to harm
wouldn’t figure more centrally in it.52
where the state forbids private vengeful retribution, fairness demands that an opportunity
for redress be provided by the state.”). “Our society thus avoids the mayhem and crudeness
of vengeful private retribution, but without the unfairness of leaving individuals powerless
against invasions of their rights.” Id. at 85.
49. Zipursky, supra note 48, at 86.
50. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 642 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds., 2002).
51. In Two Conceptions of Tort Damages, Goldberg does talk about “restoring rights,”
but it is difficult to see how this is consistent with his claim about remedies as distinct
from the rights the wronging of which they remedy. Goldberg, supra note 48, at 441.
52. The root of the difficulty is not with Goldberg and Zipursky’s focus on what have
come to be called “reactive attitudes,” such as anger, indignation, and resentment. See, e.g.,
P.F. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS (1974); R. JAY WALLACE,
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (1994). For an account relating these to relational features of morality, see STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT:
MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2006). There is a significant tradition in jurisprudence, the central text of which is Adam Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence, which
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More fundamentally, the Lockean contractarian account admits of
two interpretations. One possibility is that the claim of right is basic
and structures the remedy, but “state of nature” recourse is barbaric
only because of the lack of competent institutions. On this first reading, the conceptually basic case, through which action and reaction
are understood, is the one where claims of right are decided on
their merits, rather than through force, and the alternative to barbarism is to set up institutions that do corrective justice. 53 Civil recourse serves to make this possible; parties concerned to protect their
rights would set up institutions that do justice between them. On the
second reading, barbarism is the basic case and the idea of rights,
both as asserted and as assessed on its merits, is derivative, something that positive law has taken up as a way of domesticating
grievance.54 This latter account is at odds with a corrective justice
account because it represents the case in which claims are decided
through force as conceptually basic. It identifies a good that recourse
is supposed to serve or promote which makes no reference to the merits of an aggrieved plaintiff’s claim. On this approach, the object of
the social contract is not the upholding of rights but the satisfaction
of grievances.

makes moral sentiments of approval and resentment central, but takes the objects of those
attitudes to be what Smith calls “Perfect rights,” which he characterizes as “those which we
have a title to demand and if refused to compel an other to perform.” ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 9 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978). He later identified these with
rights to security of person and property, the importance of which he traces to the benefits
of certain patterns of human interactions. Id. at 9-10. On Smith’s account, the reactive
attitudes are warranted by wrongs, and remedies for wrongdoing are, as a corrective justice account would suggest, just the enforcement of the rights themselves. Id. at 10. I take
no stand here on whether Smith’s sentimentalist program for private rights can be completed successfully. I mention it here only because Goldberg and Zipursky appear to depart
from it, characterizing civil recourse as a substitute for private revenge that is required to
placate unruly sentiments, organized by a set of norms distinct from those that organize
the wrongs.
53. Adam Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence provides a sentimentalist version of this
first approach:
For 1st., the resentment of the offended person leads him to correct the offender, as to make him <?feel> by whom and for what he suffers. Resentment is
never compleatly, nor as we think nobly gratified by poison or assassination.
This has in all nations and at all times been held as unmanly, because the sufferer does not by this means feel from whom, or for what, the punishment is inflicted.—2dly, the punishment which resentment dictates we should inflict on
the offender tends sufficiently to deter either him or any other from injuring us
or any other person in that manner. 3dly, resentment also leads a man to seek
redress or compensation for the injury he has received.
SMITH, supra note 52, at 105. For Smith, private revenge is a crude version of the legal
requirements of punishment and compensation, not the basic case which they replace.
54. Compare this with James Fitzjames Stephen’s often quoted claims that “[t]he
criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the
sexual appetite.” JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 99 (1863).
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The ambiguity between these two approaches permeates the social
contract argument in another way as well. The contention that the
state deprives citizens of a natural right of redress and so must give
them a right of civil recourse in its place can either be interpreted as
an application of the corrective justice ideas it is meant to replace,
focused on the need for a party who deprives another of something to
which the other has a right to provide an equivalent, or in terms of
the need to provide an alternative to private revenge in order to placate unruly passions.
The second approach would require the incorporation strategy and
may well provide its underlying motivation. It would explain each of
the four contrasts with corrective justice that Goldberg and Zipursky
assert. A grievance-based account would focus on the fact that social
norms have been taken up, regarding the principle of their selection
as a “for better or worse” feature of positive law. It would note that
remedies are selected on the basis of something other than the organizing ideas of private right. It would allow the ordinariness of defendant’s conduct to screen out grievances, refusing to empower people who complain about ordinary behavior on the part of others, and
would thematize plaintiff’s power to proceed against defendant as
having its basis in the generic fact that plaintiff was legally wronged,
rather than in the specific right of plaintiff that was violated.
I will work my way through each of the instances of the incorporation strategy in turn.
A. The Standard of Care
Consider, first, the standard of care. Although it is not obvious
how anyone, whether social scientist or court, could be in a position
to satisfy themselves on this question, I am prepared to concede that
people are more likely to “feel aggrieved or injured” if they are injured through the conduct of others that falls below the “standards
which guide ordinary careful people in ordinary life.” But that is not
enough to provide any support for Zipursky’s bolder contention that
the standard of care is not concerned with risk-taking at all. Much
depends on what, precisely, is meant by “risk-taking.”55 If it is taken
to mean, as an economic interpretation of the Learned Hand test
proposes, the calculated decision to take a risk, then certainly questions about ordinary care and the standards that guide careful people
have no bearing on whether defendant decided unwisely with respect
to a particular risk. So Zipursky’s argument is successful against the
economic interpretation of the Learned Hand test. The conventionalist account he proposes in its place is less successful. Although there
may be waiters who make a calculated decision to carry too many
55. Zipursky, supra note 37, at 2018.
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bowls of soup at one time, the clumsy waiter who spills breaches the
standard of care regardless of what, if anything, he was thinking
about. But the correct conclusion to be drawn from this is not that
carrying soup clumsily is defective because most people don’t do it or
even because most careful people don’t do it. Instead, the correct conclusion to draw is that carrying soup clumsily is defective because it
might spill on someone. The modal idea that it might spill is, of
course, just the idea of risk; the modifier “on someone” is the relational
idea of risk to someone in particular. The restaurateur who tells the
waiter to be careful need not have made an explicit calculation in order to conclude that it is too risky, but the sense in which it is too
risky is just the prospect of the waiter spilling soup on someone.56
Breach of a relational duty is not so much as engaged by talking
about the sort of clumsiness or incompetence in aspirating my drink.
Clumsiness is a non-relational feature of me, which can be made relational in either of two ways. First, someone could treat it as comparatively relational, remarking that Arthur is clumsier than Ben.
Second, one could make it non-comparatively relational by considering whether Arthur was clumsy towards Ben. The former might be
relevant to a comparative inquiry (including the sort of inquiry in
which that Goldberg and Zipursky contend loss allocation engage)
but doesn’t go to any claim plaintiff might have. Again, although
plaintiff’s anger or some other feeling, and so her impulse towards
retaliation, might be piqued by defendant’s clumsiness, any such impulse has no legal place except in relation to a wrong. The only way
defendant’s competence or its lack is relevant to plaintiff is if it is
competence or otherwise in relation to her; is it the kind of thing that
characteristically jeopardizes her right? But that is just the question
of risk; as Cardozo remarks in the Palsgraf case, risk is a term of relation.57 Neither “clumsy” nor “incompetent” is. That is why an unforeseeable plaintiff’s attitude towards the platform guard whose
clumsiness caused her injury is of no significance.
If, in order to be relevant to the breach of a relational duty, ordinariness must itself be analyzed in relational terms, then the idea of
ordinariness cannot, without more, be used to cast any doubt on the
corrective justice approach. In order to make it into a genuine com56. Stumbling or aspirating aerated beverages are misleading examples in another
respect. Each characterizes a result, rather than the manner in which the result came
about. Someone can fall or gag without any incompetence. The same point applies to careful waiters who sometimes spill soup. With respect to spilled soup, finders of fact might
take themselves to have enough general knowledge about the world to conclude that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies in such cases, and so take the fact that the soup spilled
on plaintiff as strong circumstantial evidence that the waiter was careless towards plaintiff. But even in those cases, the circumstantial evidence suggests that conduct was too
dangerous in the sense of being too likely to go wrong.
57. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
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parison, we would have to determine how, based on the corrective
justice approach, the requirement that people avoid excessive danger
to others, or excessive interference with their neighbors more generally, could be made determinate and given effect by a finder of fact
charged with determining, in relation to a concrete dispute, whether
defendant had been careful enough. And here, it seems, the corrective justice account has a straightforward answer.
Aristotle was the first to write of corrective justice, and his formulation of the most general form any such answer might take still
commends itself. Aristotle remarks that there are fundamental limits
to any purely theoretical analysis in determining what virtue requires in a concrete situation.58 He is not suggesting that virtue admits of no theoretical analysis, only that, if you are trying to make
yourself virtuous, the thing to do is stop reflecting and, turning on
your own good judgment, try and pick a phronimos, an exemplar to
copy, to make yourself more like one.59 Aristotle’s discussion of corrective justice is included in his catalogue of the virtues and the same
thought applies to it. If you want to know what it is to be careful—
given that, at the most abstract level, being careful is just a matter of
limiting the foreseeable side effects of your conduct to the level that
is the inevitable concomitant of pursuing your purposes in a public
world in which others do the same—you ask what ordinary careful
people do. The ordinary careful person serves as an exemplar, without being an ideal of complete virtue; as exemplar, the ordinary careful person shows what actual people can achieve and so sets an
achievable norm.60 Any such characterization runs the risk of circularity, but it is difficult to see why this would be objectionable61 since
the task is to instruct the finder of fact as to how to frame the issue,
how to think about whether defendant was being careful enough on
this occasion. That is why Lord Reid’s discussion of the standard of
care in Bolton v. Stone consists largely of platitudes—if the risk is
fantastic and far-fetched, you may ignore it, if it is “infinitesimal”
then you may normally ignore it, but if the risk is real you just have
to stop what you are doing, even if that means that “if cricket cannot

58. See generally ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI (Lesley Brown ed.,
David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
59. See id.
60. As Smith points out, the careful and prudent person may warrant only a certain
“cold” esteem rather than the full admiration of the fully virtuous person. ADAM SMITH,
THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 253 (Knud Haakonssen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
2002) (1759).
61. Unless it is assumed, as some advocates of economic analysis wish to, but Goldberg and Zipursky do not, that all tort concepts must be reducible to concepts expressible
without remainder in some other vocabulary. On the nature of circularity in common law
reasoning, see Martin Stone, Legal Positivism as an Idea about Morality, 61 U. TORONTO
L.J. 313, 314 (2011).

2011]

SEPARATION OF WRONGS AND REMEDIES

191

be played safely on a ground, it should not be played at all.”62 His further gloss, in Wagon Mound II, adds a further near-platitude: you are
not allowed to ignore infinitesimal risks imposed by your conduct if
you could go about your own purposes in a way that is just the same
from your point of view and makes it significantly safer for somebody
else.63 The platitudes remain helpful because they all concern something
that ordinary people already know how to do. The thing they know
how to do is not how to be ordinary, but rather how to be careful. Private right gives a characterization of what it is to be careful and why
carefulness raises issues of justice. It doesn’t give instructions on how
to be careful. It tells you what is at stake, how to frame the question,
and how to think about it, not what to think about it. But once you
know how to think about it, the obvious thing to do is to consider the
familiar examples, both as particulars and as abstract archetypes.
B. Duty
Goldberg and Zipursky suggest that the task of the law is to pick
up on preexisting social duties. They draw attention to the “plurality”
of fundamentally different interests protected by tort liability.64
Goldberg is explicit about the role of law in recognizing particular
interests as worthy of protection and vindication:
Specifically, it is used to refer to a set of individual interests that
the law recognizes as worthy of protection and vindication. For example, even though interference with one’s interest in being free
from annoyance—or in having aesthetically pleasing surroundings—might fairly be treated as a setback or harm to the victim,
neither is treated by tort law as a sufficiently weighty interest to
warrant recognition of duties on the part of others to refrain from
or avoid interfering with that interest. If D acts carelessly with regard to P’s interest in not being annoyed so as proximately to
cause P annoyance, P has no tort cause of action against D because
the law of negligence does not regard the suffering of annoyance as
the sort of harm that rises to the level of an injury, even though
the annoyance is a loss or harm suffered by P.65

The vocabulary of interests and the idea that they enter the law on
the basis of factors external to ideas of wrongdoing is developed further in Torts as Wrongs:

62. Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850 (H.L.) 867 (appeal taken from Eng.).
63. See Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v. Miller Steamship Co. (Wagon Mound II),
[1967] 1 A.C. 617 (H.L.).
64. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 941.
65. Goldberg, supra note 48, at 440 n.16; see also JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN
C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 27-45 (2010) (discussing
tort law’s “gallery of wrongs”).
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Tortious wrongdoing always involves an interference with one of a
set of individual interests that are significant enough aspects of a
person’s well-being to warrant the imposition of a duty on others
not to interfere with the interest in certain ways, notwithstanding
the liberty restriction inherent in such a duty imposition. In part out
of a sense of the limitations as to what sorts of interferences and
injuries are justiciable, and in part for policy considerations that
have changed over time with changes in social norms and economic
and political circumstances, courts and legislatures have never
sought to render interferences with all such interests actionable.66

I want to suggest, however, that focusing on interests protected
and social norms distracts from the structure of reasoning in which
the putatively diverse interests figure and that the norms express.
Social norms figure in the determination of abstract concepts of right,
and interests only matter if they can be brought under the concept of
right. That means, at a minimum, that neither non-relational judgments about well-being nor comparative assessments of whether interests are “weighty” are the starting points for analysis. In giving
effect to corrective justice, the positive law must, as Lord Atkin suggests, pay close attention to what is a social wrong. But it does so by
already presupposing the concept of a wrong and so of what it is for
one person to wrong another, as one person’s violation of another’s
right. And here, the question of duty is not a matter of social norms
at all, but rather a question of each person’s right to the security of
his or her person, property, and reputation. Freedom from annoyance
is not insufficiently “weighty” as an “interest”; although it may have
a significant impact on “well-being,” it is the wrong sort of thing to be
the object of a right. Because the “duty” question is antecedent to the
question of standard of care (even though each concerns a different
aspect of the same risk), it does not focus on how careful defendant
needs to be but only on whether this sort of defendant, engaged in
this activity, needs to be careful for the sake of this aspect of plaintiff’s right. That question cannot be answered in terms of an interest
that is characterized without reference to a right because interests
are not constraints on the conduct of others.
Goldberg’s choice of annoyance as an example67 masks the significance of these structural features of duty by introducing an interest
that his readers are likely to regard as trivial and leaving out any
characterization of how the annoyance comes about. His example of
aesthetic surroundings68 is misleading in another way, as it looks like
a busybody interest in restricting what others do with their own
property and so is relational in the wrong direction. But neither of
66. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 937.
67. See Goldberg, supra note 48, at 440 n.16.
68. See id.
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these captures what is distinctive about relational rights, and so the
fact that the interests at issue will not be “weighty” enough is overdetermined. Both are cases in which no possible right is at issue and so
provide no support for the contention that whether the law finds a
right and correlative duty depends upon how weighty an interest is.
In order for institutions to make the requirement of looking out for
the rights of others concrete, however, they inevitably engage in a
task of judgment and classification: Is this case like that one or more
like the other one? In asking such questions, courts are best understood as giving effect to the abstract requirements of right. In developing the law, the place of judgment is ineliminable. From this it follows that a contextual and incremental approach is likely to recommend itself. The point is not that this is the only logically possible
way of making abstract relational norms concrete, but rather that it
is one possible way, and the most obvious, and the most consonant
with general concerns about the rule of law, which demand that citizens be in a position to have at least a general idea of what the law
demands of them. The ways in which ordinary careful people think
about the demands of social life are not the last word, but they can be
taken to be instantiations of the general categories of right, and ordinary people can be in a position to assess their own conduct and that
of others.
The advice to proceed with good judgment, contextually and incrementally, is itself like Aristotle’s advice about finding yourself a
phronimos. It tells you why you need one but doesn’t tell you what to do.
It just tells you how to think about it. But given that the purpose is to
create a system in which each is entitled to use his or her own means,
restricted only by the entitlement of others to do the same, there is
no other place to look for guidance except in the way in which people
living consistently with the entitlements of others order their lives.
At the same time, no amount of contextualization or good judgment can provide a basis for rejecting private right’s signature distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance. The incorporation
strategy has difficulty explaining why this should be so. In certain
contexts, there are social norms prohibiting aggressively competitive
behavior, and in others there are norms demanding that people contribute to the individual and collective well-being of others. In still
other contexts, social norms strongly discourage people from standing
on their rights. Were any of these norms not generally observed, social life would be much harsher than it is. At least some of these
norms are relational, and at least some of those create a sense of
grievance in those who are denied the benefits that compliance with
them would provide. By focusing on the incorporation of preexisting
social norms, rather than regarding the norms the law does take up

194

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol 39:163

as instantiations of basic structures of rightful interaction,69 Goldberg
and Zipursky represent the law’s failure to take up norms of mutual
aid or generosity as sociologically and legally accidental, at least in
cases in which the interests at stake are no less weighty. As such,
they risk representing the law’s insistence on the distinction between
nonfeasance and misfeasance as itself an accident of positive law, a
demarcation among the plurality of suitably relational duties that
must be explained in terms of something non-relational. Yet, it is difficult to see how such an explanation could go, because the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance pays no attention to the
weightiness of the interests that are at stake. Not only does the law
permit people to ignore the impact of their conduct on the interests of
others if no right is at issue. It also distinguishes between types of
conduct that are equivalent in their impact on plaintiff’s well-being
or any other interest of plaintiff apart from the specifically legal interests protected by rights. The idea of substantive standing cannot
be brought in to solve this problem because it can be taken in two
ways. It could just be a name applied on a case by case basis to whatever interests are regarded as weighty, in which case it reproduces
the difficulty it was supposed to solve. Alternatively, it could be taken
to correspond to the idea of rights to person and property and so gives
up on ideas of social norms being incorporated and interests being
regarded as weighty.70 By focusing on “weightiness,” the incorporation strategy runs together a hypothesis about why someone might
think that it was important to protect rights to person and property—because they matter to well-being—with an analysis of how the
law conceptualizes them. The law does not conceptualize them as
“weighty”; it conceptualizes them as rights. That is why, as Zipursky
and Goldberg rightly observe, the law does not protect against pure
economic loss, however weighty, but does protect against property
damage and even trespass apart from their effects.
Juridical structure figures more prominently in Goldberg and
Zipursky’s discussions of doctrine than in their theoretical recon69. For present purposes, I take no stand on how best to ground those structures. The
key point is that the structures organize the ways in which people are entitled to use their
means. For example, Adam Smith’s narrow category of “perfect rights” is grounded in the
long term benefits for mankind of their recognitions but is supposed to comprehend rights
to person and property and to provide grounds for enforcement. See SMITH, supra note 52,
at 9. The structure on which Smith focuses can be characterized apart from the fact that
positive law happens to have taken it up.
70. Zipursky reports that issues of substantive standing first came to his attention in
fraud cases in which plaintiff only recovers if she relies on a fraudulent misrepresentation
made to her. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, and Corrective Justice, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 299, 301 (2011). It is difficult to see what relation this
structure could bear to that of interests being weighty. The person who relies on a representation made to her and the one who relies on one made to another person have the exact
same interest in play, unless the interest itself is characterized in terms of the relation,
rather than vice versa.
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struction of it. In their exemplary essay on social host liability,71 they
operate with a firm grasp of the relation between the abstract and
contextual. By distinguishing between a social host and a tavern operator, they draw attention to the way in which various activities are
conducted in this society as a way of characterizing what counts as
being careful and towards whom. On a sufficiently thin characterization of foreseeability, both the social host of a party to which guests
bring their own alcoholic beverages and the tavern keeper can foresee
that their activities might lead to injury to users of the road as a result of drunk driving. The only way to distinguish them is to focus on
the kind of activity, distinguishing between providing people with
intoxicating substances and providing a venue in which people consume their own. But of course, just as abstract norms do not apply
themselves to particulars, so, too, characterizations of activity-types
do not apply themselves either. Instead, the salience of a particular
activity depends in part on how it is understood in the society. At the
same time, how it is understood needs to be parsed in terms of the
fundamental legal concepts, such as the distinction between serving
someone a mind altering substance and providing them with a venue
to do what they will, knowing that serving such substances to themselves are among the things they will do. Such abstract concepts
could perhaps without injustice be applied differently in a different
society, but their social application is the way in which these people
in this society do apply them. Looking to such factors, then, is not
just the incorporation of an antecedent social norm; it is the application of a general requirement of right to a particular activity, which
is classified in terms of a social norm.
C. Remedies
The same general structure applies to the issue of remedies. In
determining plaintiff’s right to get back what she already had, the
court must first make a determination of what she had, including
both what power or object it was and how she was using it. Any such
determination will inevitably be contextual and will depend, to some
extent, on how things are understood (or misunderstood) in the society. Goldberg and Zipursky repeatedly contend that “make whole”
damages are at most a “default.”72 Yet, their status even as a default
is baffling from the point of view of civil recourse understood as domesticated anger. Their legal role in harm-based torts is not only as a
default, which a court might reject in favor of some other measure.
Instead, they provide the basis on which any further heads of damag-

71. John C.P. Goldberg, Social Host Liability and Beyond: How to Think About Intervening Wrongdoing (Sept. 2007) (on file with author).
72. Cf. Goldberg, supra note 48, at 443-44 (characterizing as a “guideline”).
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es are built. That is why harm-based torts enable defendant to avoid
liability by identifying a supervening non-tortious cause of plaintiff’s
injury: by showing that he did not deprive plaintiff of anything to
which she had a right against him, defendant addresses neither her
grief nor her sense of grievance but does show that making her whole
is not the expression of a constraint on defendant’s behavior. On this
understanding, rights and remedies are seamless. Not only do the
rights of plaintiffs form an integrated system; remedies give effect to
that system.
I do, however, want to pause to note that the “injustice” charge
that Goldberg and Zipursky lay against tort law is itself unjust.
Let me repeat the passage about eggshell plaintiffs, which I regard
as representative:
Successful tort plaintiffs will sometimes be entitled to something
more than “justice” demands or even permits, at least if justice is
understood as the achievement of a just distribution of gains and
losses as between tortfeasor and victim. Here, the most obvious
example is the eggshell plaintiff, who may stand to recover a huge
amount of compensation from a minimally culpable defendant. It
is questionable whether justice is being done in such cases, but our
tort system authorizes this sort of outcome because tort law is not
a scheme for restoring a normative equilibrium as between doer
and sufferer. It is, for better and worse, a law for the redress of
private wrongs.73

To the contrary, the eggshell plaintiff’s recovery is a matter of justice. She recovers because she has been wronged; the extent of the
injury determines the extent of the wrong and so, too, of the remedy.
Perhaps Goldberg and Zipursky suppose that the only form of justice
that counts would be the achievement of a “just distribution of gains
and losses as between tortfeasor and victim,”74 or one that makes liability a function of culpability. But any such form of justice, if indeed
there is one, is comparative and only derivatively relational. And it
73. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 19, at 1581. Compare Zipursky’s earlier formulation:
Our moral convictions about the existence and extent of a tortfeasor’s duties of
repair are sensitive to an array of features extrinsic to whether there was a
wrongful injury to the plaintiff and what would make the plaintiff whole. These
features include, for example, whether and how badly the victim needs compensation, not just her entitlements; what funds the defendant can draw on to
compensate the plaintiff; and whether there are other claims on those funds.
Zipursky, supra note 2, at 729. Even if these are “our moral convictions,” they could at
most be relevant to the issue of whether plaintiff’s “entitlement” should prevail over them,
not whether plaintiff has such an entitlement as a matter of justice. The latter formulation
is more interesting because it addresses that issue head on. The two formulations are alike,
however, in objecting to corrective justice as an account of law by introducing an undifferentiated idea of morality, showing that the law does not conform to it and concluding that
the law therefore does not meet the requirements of corrective justice.
74. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 19, at 1581.
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gives no ground for connecting plaintiff and defendant for purposes of
the comparison of their non-relational features. Indeed, such a conception would have no room for the idea of a relational wrong at all,
since it seems to presuppose that the wrong itself (and so the right
that it violates) are matters of degree antecedent to the transaction
between plaintiff and defendant. Perhaps this is what leads Goldberg
and Zipursky to draw the sharp distinction that they do between
wrongs and remedies, since their characterization of wrongs already
abstracts from considerations of gain, loss, and comparative culpability. If, as they contend, tort law is a law of wrongs, however, then any
righting of those wrongs must have the same formal structure as the
wrongs themselves. The eggshell plaintiff recovers because she has
been wronged, that is, because her right has been invaded. The right
itself neither has nor lacks a magnitude or an extent, but the object
of the right, and so the object of the invasion, has one. Defendant’s
wrongful act deprives plaintiff of something to which she had a right.
The fact that depriving her turned out to be much more expensive
than depriving others is not relevant; all that matters is that she has
been wronged. The extent of an injury is just the extent of the invasion of her right, and so all that she gets back is what any plaintiff
gets back, namely what she already had as a matter of right.75 That
is why plaintiff recovers; she is still entitled to that of which defendant deprived her, and her claim against the defendant depends on
the fact that a right has been violated, not on the specifics of the object of the right, and so, as a special case of this, it does not depend
on how expensive it is to compensate her. In other places, Goldberg
and Zipursky raise the same objection in cases in which minor negligence leads to massive liability for lost income.76 It may be that they
mean to include such cases in the eggshell category. They are distinct, but no more difficult for corrective justice to explain: Having

75. It is not clear why, on the recourse theory, if it is distinct from corrective justice,
thin-skulled plaintiffs would recover for the full extent of their injuries. Why would the
measure of plaintiff’s recourse be the extent of plaintiff’s injury? Why would the law empower someone to recover on the basis of his or her own vulnerability rather than the way
in which a typical or ordinary person others would respond to the same wrong? More generally, why would questions of the extent of injury be relevant to the extent of liability at
all rather than making the fact of injury the trigger of liability measured in some other
way, which was presented as the feature that distinguished civil recourse from corrective
justice? Conversely, it is not clear why, on recourse theory, the ultrasensitive plaintiff rule
would be part of the law of tort. The person who foreseeably, or even knowingly, causes
injury to an unusually sensitive plaintiff is not liable. Yet, such a plaintiff has every reason
to be aggrieved. Moreover, such an aggrieved plaintiff is blocked from taking matters into
his or her own hands. Why, then, would there be no remedy? By contrast, on the corrective
justice view, the reasonable person standard, the thin-skull rule, and the ultrasensitive
plaintiff rule form an integrated set because they are all derived from the basic idea of each
person’s entitlement to what he or she already has.
76. See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 14, at 1140-43; Goldberg & Zipursky,
supra note 19, at 1581.

198

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol 39:163

deprived her of something to which she had a right, defendant thereby deprived her of the use of that thing; if that thing was a chattel,
defendant would have deprived her of the use to which she would
otherwise have put it; if instead defendant deprived her of her skin,
defendant thereby deprived her of the protection her skin would have
afforded her.
D. Powers and the Plaintiff’s Initiative
In the passage just quoted and others like it, it appears that Goldberg and Zipursky’s rejection of corrective justice theory views it as
an account which describes a pattern of benefits and burdens. Perhaps the contention that the fact that a tort suit is initiated by plaintiff, rather than by the state, provides an objection to corrective justice depends on a similar conception of what corrective justice must
be. If corrective justice were concerned with achieving or restoring a
pattern of holdings, then it would indeed be a mystery why litigation
is initiated by the plaintiff rather than the state. After all, if the state
is involved in seeing to it that justice is done, why leave it to the
plaintiff’s initiative? Indeed, if justice is important, it might be
thought that it is too important to be left in plaintiff’s hands. As
Zipursky remarks, “A right of action is a privilege and a power, and
the state is not committed to the normative desirability of its exercise, only to the right to have it.”77
Goldberg and Zipursky develop this point by arguing that if tort
represented the principle of corrective justice, the defendant would be
under a duty to make repair quite apart from plaintiff’s power to demand it. If justice requires that a wrong be undone, then it would not
be up to the victim of the wrong to decide whether to initiate proceedings against the wrongdoer. They suggest that were the law concerned to see to it that justice is done, in the case of a private wrong,
the state would step in to enforce the right in something like the way
in which some criminal fraud statutes require that the fraud repay
those who have been duped and do not make the repayment conditional on any act on the part of the dupes. That is not, however, how
the law of tort works; it gives the aggrieved plaintiff a power to proceed against a wrongdoer, but whether to exercise that power is left
entirely at plaintiff’s discretion.
Goldberg and Zipursky are certainly right to draw attention to the
fact that the power lies in the hands of the plaintiff. Only plaintiff
may compel defendant to repair the wrong. From this they conclude
further that defendant is not under any legal duty to repair the
wrong, since, they assume, were defendant under such a duty, then it
would be within the purview of the state (or, for that matter, almost
77. Zipursky, supra note 2, at 741.
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anyone) to see to it that defendant does its duty.78 As Zipursky puts
it, “The courts in tort law do not stand ready to facilitate the rectification of wrongdoing, or to restore a normative equilibrium, as corrective justice theorists maintain. Instead, they empower individuals
to obtain an avenue of recourse against other private parties.”79
If this structural feature of the law is to count as an objection to
the corrective justice account, however, Goldberg and Zipursky would
need to establish that the corrective justice account would lead to a
different structure. If corrective justice were a matter of an appropriate balance of benefits and burdens as between plaintiff and defendant, it would be unclear why plaintiff in particular would have the
power to enforce it. If it were a balance of benefits and burdens, then
any party capable of bringing about the right balance would be under
the same kind of duty to do so, or, at least, the party generally
charged with whatever duties of distributive justice are applicable
would be so charged.
If Goldberg and Zipursky were correct to characterize corrective
justice in this way, then it would indeed be all but conclusive against
an account of tort law in terms of corrective justice to point out that
the aggrieved victim, rather than the state, commences a tort action.
It would be decisive to contend that consequential damages in general and thin-skull damages in particular show that gains and losses
are not distributed in accordance with culpability. More generally,
the fact that the law does not act directly against defendant, but rather empowers plaintiff to do so is fatal to any view that makes corrective justice be a pattern of holdings that a court is charged with
generating. All of these objections start from the thought that corrective justice must be conceived as a goal and tort law as a more or less
reliable instrument for achieving the goal; each objection points out,
in its own way, that tort law looks nothing like an optimal tool for
achieving the goal, so understood.
But corrective justice is nothing like that; it is not the characterization of a worthwhile goal to be achieved. It follows that it is not a
distributive theory, not even a small-scale version of distributive justice between plaintiff and defendant. It is not a theory of desert or
proportionality, not an attempt to approximate a normative order in
which suffering is proportionate to wickedness. Nor is corrective justice properly understood, as Goldberg and Zipursky contend some
scholars have understood it, as a matter of loss allocation.80 Allocating losses, at least as they characterize it, is an end to be achieved,
and the question of who would do the best job of achieving such an

78. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 957-60.
79. Zipursky, supra note 2, at 755.
80. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 926 (discussing Coleman and Perry).
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end is, again, an open question with no presumption in favor of leaving the task in the hands of the plaintiff.
Nor does corrective justice ask “Prosser’s question” about what to
do when faced with a negligent defendant and an innocent plaintiff.
It is almost as though, having seen through Prosser-style doctrinal
legal realism, Goldberg and Zipursky find themselves not fully able
to accept that anyone could be even more extreme in rejecting it. But
that is exactly the position of corrective justice.
Instead of being a matter of either distributive justice or loss allocation, corrective justice is concerned with rights governing the ways
in which people are permitted to use their means in setting and pursuing their purposes. As a doctrine of means, in the sense characterized above, corrective justice makes every question of how a person’s
means are to be used a question that is, in the first instance, for that
person to decide. I can permit you to do what would otherwise be a
wrong against me, I can enter into contractual arrangements with
you, and I can acquiesce in what would otherwise be your unilateral
creation of novel legal relations between us. That is, it is a general
feature of every private right that “the state is not committed to the
normative desirability of its exercise, only to the right to have it.”81
Within this structure, it is not merely unsurprising but inevitable
that plaintiff alone is entitled to decide whether or not to stand on his
or her rights in cases of wrongdoing. That is a general feature of a
right as between private parties; the right holder determines whether to enforce it. If, as the corrective justice account contends, a right
survives its own violation, the bearer of the right is the one who is
entitled to decide whether to exercise the surviving right.
Moreover, because corrective justice is a principle for courts, it
governs the binding arbitration of private disputes; it does not demand that disputes be resolved. The parties are free to negotiate
whatever resolution they regard as satisfactory; the court concerns
itself not with negotiation but with arbitration.
The familiar requirement that the plaintiff proceed against defendant reflects both the rights that are at issue and the role of a
court as arbiter of disputes. Because it regards damages as grounded
in and restoring the right that defendant has breached, Kantian
right regards the right to damages as having the structure of every
other right, and so something that plaintiff can invoke or decline to
invoke. A right constrains the conduct of others, but the bearer of the
right determines whether to exercise it. In this, a remedial right is no
different from the primary right. It follows from this analysis that a
tort suit must be initiated by plaintiff, simply because plaintiff, or
someone authorized to act on plaintiff’s behalf, is the only one with
81. Zipursky, supra note 2, at 741.

2011]

SEPARATION OF WRONGS AND REMEDIES

201

standing to exercise any right that she has. That she can only exercise it through the court’s procedures does not make it any different.
The role of the court does place the onus on plaintiff to establish the
elements of the wrong against her, but that requirement is a way of
enforcing rights, not an alternative to their enforcement.
This structure of the right holder deciding whether to enforce a
right is familiar in the traditional rule according to which the remedy
in cases of nuisance is an injunction. Although American law has
moved away from this idea,82 the rest of the common law world has
continued to follow the rule laid down in Shelfer v. City of London
Electrical Lighting Co.,83 according to which an injunction is the remedy for a nuisance except in those cases in which the injury is small,
easily compensated, and easily calculated, and the injunction would
serve only to enable the plaintiff to oppress the defendant. In order to
be granted an injunction, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s conduct interferes with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of
his or her land. That is, plaintiff must establish that defendant’s land
use constitutes a legal wrong. At the same time, plaintiff could instead decide to simply put up with defendant’s conduct. Plaintiff
alone is charged with deciding, simply because it is plaintiff’s right
that is at issue.
It is not a satisfactory response to this structure to insist that the
injunction does not enforce plaintiff’s right to be free of the nuisance
because if defendant owed plaintiff a duty of non-interference, the
state would step in and enforce it instead. Yet, that is the apparent
form of Goldberg and Zipursky’s objection in the case of damages
where the objection faces the same difficulty. Indeed, the same equation of having a duty with the prospect of direct enforcement by a
public authority leads ineluctably to the conclusion that tort law does
not include duties of non-injury, as a public authority does not directly enforce them either.
If defendant owes plaintiff a duty as a continuation of the right
defendant violated, plaintiff alone is entitled to decide whether to
hold defendant to that duty. The power of enforcement is the power
to give effect to a right that already exists.84 It is not an accident that
a right can be enforced, and it is arguably an essential feature of legal rights that a procedure be available for giving effect to them. But

82. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
83. Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co., [1895] 1 Ch. 287 (A.C.) (Eng.).
84. The same point applies to the right to exclude a trespasser. A landowner’s right to
exclude empowers her to do so. If she declines or fails to do so, the state will not step in to
do so instead. If a landowner fails to exclude for a sufficient period of time, the statute of
limitations will apply, and a trespasser may gain a prescriptive right. The fact that the
state plays no active role in enforcing a landowner’s right to exclude does not show that the
power to exclude is analytically unrelated to a right.
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the power granted presupposes the existence and validity of the
rights in question.
It may be that Goldberg and Zipursky’s focus on plaintiff’s power
is supposed to show that defendant is not subject to a duty, but rather merely a liability, and they mean to draw attention to the fundamental role of a court in ordering a remedy. This, too, is not an objection to the Kantian account but rather a direct implication of it.
Just as legal institutions are required to determine the application of
concepts of right to particulars, so, too, they are required to authorize
the enforcement of rights.85 The rights of the parties provide the basis
on which a court orders defendant to pay plaintiff, and in so doing
empowers plaintiff to compel payment. The court must order the result because only a court is entitled to impose an enforceable requirement on any specific person.86 The example of injunctions makes
this point especially clear; because it is a coercive order, a court must
order an injunction even though its content is identical to that of the
duty to which it gives effect.
Kantian right thus sees that the specifically remedial aspects of
tort law are continuous with the remedial aspects of, for example,
contract law because the remedial aspects of each reflect the underlying rights. It would be highly artificial to suggest that plaintiff in a
contract action gets a right of recourse, displacing her tendency towards private revenge, because she must, in her own name and of
her own right, initiate proceedings against defendant who breached a
contract with her and receives not only what defendant had promised
but also consequential damages. It would be no less artificial to contend that contract law is not concerned with holding defendants to
the commitments they have undertaken because it only gives plaintiffs a power to proceed against them,87 or that there is no legal duty
to pay for services for which one has contracted on the grounds that
the state will not compel payment unless the creditor first demands
it.88 Instead, a more natural way of thinking of both of these depart85. I explain this in more detail in Force and Freedom, RIPSTEIN, supra note 20, at
107-44. Kant goes so far as to argue that the existence of procedures of public right, including courts, making rights enforceable after the fact is the precondition of private rights
surviving their own violation and, so being, conclusive rather than merely provisional.
86. See Stephen Smith, Why Courts Make Orders (And What This Tells Us About
Damages), 64 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1, 1-37 (2011).
87. See generally Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of
Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529 (2011). Even in those cases when nonexpectation damages are awarded, whether based on reliance or restitution, the measure of
the remedy is determined by the right violated.
88. In an earlier article, Zipursky assimilated the corrective justice view to the
Holmesian “disjunctive” account of contract, according to which a contract imposed on
promisor the duty to either perform or pay damages; Zipursky’s suggestion was that if the
remedy is the continuation of the duty in tort, then wrongdoing and its repair is an option
available to defendants. Zipursky, supra note 48, at 70-76. Once more, this is not what
corrective justice requires. The right survives its own violation in the sense that it contin-
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ments of private law is as systems of rights in which the remedial
aspect follows the underlying rights and in which the procedure
whereby plaintiff asserts a right against defendant serves to give effect to those rights.89 That there is such a procedure is fundamental to
the enforceability and so to the force of those rights. But the procedure
doesn’t have some other function apart from giving effect to the rights.
V. CONCLUSION
It is time to take stock. I have suggested that the features of tort
law that Zipursky and Goldberg point to as evidence of the inadequacy of corrective justice and the superiority of civil recourse are actually features that are not only consistent with corrective justice but of
which corrective justice provides a superior and fully conceptual account. With respect to what we might call the narrow principle of civil recourse, according to which plaintiff has a power to enforce a
right, civil recourse is not merely consistent with, but required by,
corrective justice. I have also argued that the attempt to distinguish
a more ambitious idea of civil recourse, understood as domesticated
anger and retaliation, must fail. Not only does it fail to integrate with
the relational nature of duty; it also falls into the very sort of functionalist instrumentalism that pragmatic conceptualism sought to
leave behind.
In this concluding Section, I want to return to the general issue of
what it is to give a conceptual account of an area of legal doctrine.
Zipursky introduces the idea of pragmatic conceptualism in several
ues to constrain defendant, even if in changed circumstances different actions or omissions
will be required to conform to the constraint. Moreover, the suggestion that the corrective
justice view entails the Holmesian disjunctive view rests on a series of illicit inferences:
first, the reduction of an imperative (“don’t do A!”) to a material conditional (“if A, then C”)
is treated as which is subsequently transposed into a disjunction (“not A or C”). That
Holmes would be happy with such a reduction comes as no surprise, given his embrace of a
predictive theory of law formulated in terms of advice to the so-called “bad man.” See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Supreme Judicial Council of Mass., The Path of the Law,
Address Before the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 461 (1897). But the Holmesian approach is internally inconsistent, since it treats the
resulting disjunction as an imperative. If defendant neither performs nor pays, whatever
further results would follow would have to be added as yet another disjunct (perform or pay
or face a contempt sanction) and so on ad infinitum. The same generality in the Holmesian
approach permits the characterization of recourse in the same disjunctive terms: “If you
injure another, you will be liable to recourse” is equivalent to “don’t injure or accept recourse.” Goldberg and Zipursky rightly insist on the imperatival nature of duty, Goldberg
& Zipursky, supra note 19, at 1575-77, and would presumably also regard a court order
granting a remedy as an imperative. Having done so, they cannot deny corrective justice
theory the modal resources to which they legitimately help themselves.
89. In the unusual class of cases in which the right and power reside in separate persons—cases of third party beneficiaries to contracts—the third party has a power to enforce
a right that resides in another person. There is a doctrinal puzzle about how this can be so,
but the puzzle cannot even be formulated unless the power is understood to be the power to
enforce a right.
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stages. He first takes note of recent developments in the philosophy
of language, concentrating especially on holism about meaning and
the importance of inference. He then focuses on the role of concepts
in structuring practices and argues that the key to understanding
law lies in the recognition that judges create law rather than merely
elaborating it.90 The result is an account of what it is to explain a doctrinal area:
On the sort of pragmatism I am considering, to understand the
concepts and principles within an area of the law is to grasp from
within the practices of the law the pattern of verbal and practical
inferences that constitute the relevant area of the law. Accordingly, to explain some area of the law is, in part, to display the concepts and principles the grasping of which constitutes understanding the law, and to do so in such a way as to make that form of understanding available. A criterion for a successful explanation will
be the capacity to see how the verbal and practical inferences within the pattern “go on.” To understand a legal provision is to grasp
the pattern of inferences that underlies how the law has been used
and to be able to recognize a variety of scenarios in which the provision would or would not be exemplified.91

I think this approach has much to recommend because, despite
the novel wording, it is methodologically indistinguishable from the
Kantian formalism advocated by Weinrib.92 Talk of “moves,” “mastery,” “licence,” and “grasp” express the requirements of reasoning
with concepts in a vocabulary borrowed from games and the exercise
of bodily skill. However, following it through consistently leads to a
narrow conception of the distinction between creating and elaborating law and with it to a rejection of the bifurcation between duties
and remedies. That this bifurcation is given effect by the idea of incorporation, as deployed in relation to a social contractarian theory
about the renunciation of private revenge, is not an accident.93 Here,
90. See Zipursky, supra note 8 at 471-73.
91. Id. at 473.
92. Zipursky continues, “[T]he notion of the content of the law ‘itself’ is a notion of a
domain of power for legal officials in which certain moves are licensed because they are
part of what flows out of a mastery of the concepts within the law.” Id. at 475.
93. Zipursky’s original essay on pragmatic conceptualism takes as its focus the higher-order or “meta” question of the status of the conceptual connections examined and articulated: How are they possible? This difference makes no difference to the debate between
corrective justice and civil recourse. Are they, as Kant would have it, synthetic a priori, or
are they, instead, just immanent in, because constitutive of, a way of doing things that a
group of human beings in a particular time and place happen to have adopted for reasons
that may remain shrouded in the mists of history? Do we work outward from abstract concepts of right or inward from the structural features of existing law? Any such differences
between the approaches can be ignored as they are irrelevant to the analysis of what this
group of human beings is doing right now. If that is the question, then, exactly the same
things need to be analyzed, in exactly the same way. Moreover, putting aside such purely
philosophical concepts as the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and
that between a priori and a posteriori judgments, the same tools are available to both en-
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it seems to me, Goldberg and Zipursky abandon conceptualism at the
very point at which it is able to most illuminate its subject matter
because they drive a wedge between rights and remedies, and indeed,
a wedge between a right and the power to enforce it.
When a court seeks to determine whether defendant owes plaintiff
a duty or when a finder of fact seeks to determine whether defendant
exercised reasonable care, the question at issue enters into a chain of
reasoning, the conclusion of which will be a finding that defendant is
or is not liable. A conceptual account of this reasoning must make
each of the elements of the determination of liability potentially relevant to the conclusion in support of which it is argued. If the court
asks whether plaintiff was in the class of persons about whom defendant should have been thinking as defendant went about his or
her business, the court must consider whether this situation is sufficiently similar to ones in which courts have found a duty in the past.
That piece of reasoning looks to the settled law and interprets it in
large part in terms of the familiar types of social expectations. It does
not ask a question of the general form, “Is this what ordinarily goes
on?” The same distinction applies with respect to standard of care:
the court asks itself whether defendant was being careful enough by
asking about the ways in which people who are careful towards others are careful in this kind of situation. It does not ask whether defendant’s conduct was ordinary or whether it was competent by any
other standard. If it made the latter inquiry into either the case of
duty or standard of care, whatever result it reached would be inert
from the standpoint of any further reasoning in which it might enterprises. All that either can do is focus on the form of reasoning that is involved. Whether
it is characterized as a form of reasoning, or instead as a series of “moves” made in a “language game” is neither here nor there, because, on either account, the only question is
whether, within the form of reasoning/language game or practice, a certain type of move
licenses another, that is, does the conclusion that defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care,
and breached that duty, lead to the conclusion that defendant must pay? Or is some other
step required, apart from the analysis of the rights of the parties and what follows from
them? There is also an apparatus common to both accounts, according to which we must
ask who has standing to make various claims. It is no surprise that this should be so because the conceptualist elements in pragmatism, like the conceptualist elements in Kantian philosophy, owe a substantial historical debt to juridical ideas, in particular, the juridical idea of standing. That is not to say that they are derivative of this idea, but only that
they employ it freely, and do so legitimately, whether concerned with law or with the philosophy of language, in so far as they are concerned with relations between human beings
and the claims that one person may establish in relation to others. But all of this is to say
that, in David Lewis’s lovely turn of phrase, there must be “scorekeeping in a language
game.” David K. Lewis, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, 8 J. PHIL. LOGIC 339, 359
(1979). So this “meta” difference is not going to make any difference at all to any of the
claims about the organizing concepts of that practice. And so it cannot possibly decide between civil recourse and corrective justice, nor even rule out the hypothesis that I have
been pressing, namely that civil recourse is the way in which corrective justice is given
effect. This is not merely an empirical claim about American law, but, more ambitiously,
an analysis of what it is for one private person to have a right against another private person, namely, for the first person to have standing to enforce that right.
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gage. If it asks the former question, by contrast, the question is always part of a larger inquiry as to whether defendant violated any
right of plaintiff. The duty question asks whether there was a right,
and the standard of care question (together with causation and remoteness) enters into the determination of whether the right was violated. In deploying this structure, judges can be said to be making
law in a genuine, if narrow, sense; the law develops across time, and
often a decision can go more than one way. Any specific determination
goes on to shape the space within which subsequent cases are decided.
Goldberg and Zipursky grasp this point when they focus on duty
but fail to recognize that the conceptual structure of duty must be
preserved throughout the pattern of reasoning. Further, the claim to
recourse when plaintiff is wronged can only be part of the same conceptual account that begins with the concept of duty—can only be the
conclusion of a set of inferences in which duty is a basic premise—if
recourse itself stands in inferential, rather than merely psychological
or causal, relation to the underlying duties.
The domesticated revenge account of remedies also fails to fit into
the kind of reasoning that is at issue in tort litigation. In order to determine whether a remedy is adequate as domesticated revenge, a
court would either need to do a careful psychological study of the particular plaintiff or, if it used broader categories, need to know what
kinds of plaintiffs are likely to come forward, what it will take to satisfy them, and so on. No such factors enter into a court’s reasoning.
Instead, most of the argument about remedy—the determination of
what plaintiff may exact from defendant—takes the form of argument about rights—how people are allowed to treat each other.
Plaintiff’s contention that she has been wronged points to the nature
of the duty the defendant owed to her, and defendant’s conduct in
relation to that duty, and thus to her rights. That it should be so is no
surprise; if her claim to a remedy is her claim to the continuation of a
right, her claim to a remedy finally rests on the fact that she doesn’t
cease to be entitled to constrain the defendant’s conduct in relation to
what is hers simply because defendant did something inconsistent
with that constraint. The assessment of damages then turns on an
examination of the object of the right—of what did defendant deprive
plaintiff and of what, if anything, further was the plaintiff thereby
wrongfully deprived? Plaintiff’s leading of evidence with respect to
the nature of her loss and the use that she was making or was about
to make of the object of which she was deprived seem irrelevant to
any question about placation. Yet, they are absolutely central to the
question of right, of her entitlement to possess and use what is hers.
The bifurcation between rights and remedies is the fruit of the incorporation strategy, a focus on what legal institutions happen to
have done rather than on what they are doing or how they are think-
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ing. Freed of the incorporation strategy and the resulting bifurcation
of rights and remedies, civil recourse is what the law of tort would
look like if it turned on the axis of corrective justice.

